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AnwuLTY-M u nM LMENS--WA1VR.-The petitioner delivered coal
to a ship under written agreement with her owners that payment be in
trade acceptances endorsed by third parties, and there was no stipulation
for a lien. Some of the acceptances being dishonored, the petitioner as-
serted a maritime lien, but the libel was dismissed. Held, on ccrtiorari,
that the dismissal be affirmed, on the ground that the petitioner had
waived his lien by failing to rely upon the credit of the vessel. The
President Arthur, 49 Sup. Ct. 420 (U. S. 1929).
Accepting collateral security for a claim against a vessel does not of
itself constitute a waiver of ien. See Thw Crescent, 88 Fed. 298, 299
(I). N. J. 1898). Thus, taking a mortgage on a vessel to secure future
advances of supplies does not waive the lien for such supplies. The Thom=
Morgan, 123 Fed. 781 (D. S. C. 1903). There is likewise no waiver where
promissory notes are given as security and the petitioner has surrendered
or is willing to surrender the notes when he files his libel. Rcppcrt; V.
Robinson, Fed. Cas. No. 11,703 (C. C. D. Md. 1851); The Fairhope, 235
Fed. 1007 (B. D. La. 1916); Tw Hocaline, 25 F. (2d) 503 (E. D. S. C.
1928). Contra: The Yankton, 7 F. '(2d) 384 (D. Mass. 1925). The same
result is reached even though the notes are secured by a mortgage on the
ship. The D. B. Steelmn, 48 Fed. 580 (E. D. Va. 1880); Thw Cimbria,
214 Fed. 128 (D. N. T. 1914). The majority viev allows the taking of an
accepted draft as collateral security without waiving the lien. The Cewims-
foid, 34 Fed. 399 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1888). Contra: Tlw Coastuiso, 291
Fed. 166 (D. Mass. 1923): And a claim may be charged to the shipowner,
credit may be extended to him, and he may even be sued, without bringing
about a waiver of lien. T7h Grand Republic, 138 Fed. 615 (E. D. N. Y.
1905).; cf. T7e Hattie Thon, 262 Fed. 943 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920); The
Falcon, Fed. Cas. No. 5078a (S. D. N. Y. 1859); The Loin Roc, 49 Fed.
382 (D. N. 3. 1892). Where, however, the security im' question is taken mot
merely as collateral but as the very thing upon which the claimant pri-
marily relies for payment, the lien is said to be waived. See The Sea
Flower, Fed. Cas. No. 2,577 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1848). Thus, where the
supply man deals -with the charterer of a vessel, and looks only to him
for payment, the lien is waived. The Eastern, 257 Fed. 874 (D. Mass.
1919); Th Millinocket, 266 Fed. 39A (E. D. N. Y. 1920). But cf. The
Ge. Meade, 20 Fed. 923 (C. C. D. Neb. 1884). It is likewise waived
where repairs are made on security of the owner's name, and his secured
notes are taken in payment. The Lucille, 208 Fed. 424 (S. D. Ala. 1913).
Nbr can a lien be claimed where there is a definite agreement to look to
the earnings of a vessel alone for payment. Tlw cnnio Middleton, 94 Fed.
683 (D. N. 3. 1890). A lien was held waived where the contract called
for part payment in cash and an, endorsed note for the remainder, on
the theory that in stipulating for such security as an endorsed note the
claimant can not be said to have relied on the security of the vessel. Taylor
-o. The Commonwealtz Fed. Cas. No. 13,787 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1875). In
the instant case the wording of the contract of sale and the definite stipula-
tion for endorsed trade acceptances may very well indicate a failure
to rely on the credit of the vessel and so a waiver of the maritime lien.
But see'(1929) 77 U. op PA. L. PEv..408.
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APPEAL AND ERRoR-CONNECTICUT PRACTICE-SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES.
-The plaintiff sought to recover from the defendant for death caused by
an automobile accident on the grounds of wanton misconduct, negligenceo
at common law and in violation of a statutory provision governing the
operation of automobiles, and supervening negligence. A special inter-
rogatory with reference to supervening negligence was requested but
denied because not quite properly framed. All three grounds were sub-
mitted to the jury and a general verdict was returned for the plaintiff,
judgment being entered thereon. The defendant appealed, claiming that
the trial court erred as the verdict was not justified on any one of the three
grounds. Held, that there was no error. Without regard to the other
two assignments of error, the court found the verdict justifiable on the
single ground of wanton misconduct. Ziman v. Whitley, 147 At. 370 (Conn.
1929).
Connecticut has always followed the rule that a general verdict imports
that all issues were found in favor of the prevailing party. Wladylka v.
Waterbury, 98 Conn. 305, 119 AtI. 149 (1922). And if any one count or
ground of recovery is upheld on appeal, the general verdict is thereby
supported. Aaronson v. New Haven, 94 Conn. 690, 110 At. 872 (1920);
(1920) 30 YALE L. J. 197; Wladyka v. Waterbury, supra (since, if there
were an invalid cause of action among the two or more alleged, it cannot
be known that the verdict was based thereon). A contrary rule governs
elsewhere. Grant v. Astle, 2 Doug. 722 (1781); Goldstein v. Cornwall,
215 App. Div. 402, 213 N. Y. Supp. 713 (1st Dep't 1926) (since the court
cannot tell on which theory the jury's verdict was based).; see Staten. v.
Famularo, 81 Colo. 121, 123, 253 Pac. 1066, 106T (1927). In Connecticut,
the basis of the jury's verdict cannot be discovered by taking the testimony
of the jurors. Whipple v. Fardig, 146 AtI. 847 (Conn. 1929). And it Is
doubtful if the judge can interrogate the jurors after verdict rendered
as to the basis of their verdict. However, the adverse party can protect
himself against the implications of a general verdict by seeking special
verdicts on each count, or, as required by more modern practice, vhero
there are several causes of action or, for example, several specifications
of negligence in one count, by requesting the submission of special inter-
rogatories as to each one. See Wolcott v. Coleman, 2 Conn. 324, 338 (1817) ;
State v. Stebbins, 29 Conn. 463, 471 (1861); Aaronson V. New Haven,
supra at 697, 110 Atl. at 874. According to the rules of practice, their
submission is discretionary with the court. CONN. PRACTICE BooK (1922)
§ 236. But in view of the rule as stated in the Aaronson case, it is
pointed out that a party must have a right so to protect himself and,
if a timely request for proper interrogatories is made, their submission is
mandatory on the court. See Callahan v. Jurse, 100 Conn. 490, 493, 124
Atl. 31, 32 (1924). As the rule stood before the instant case, appeal
could be taken from error in the trial of one of several independent issues
only when proper interrogatories had been offered for submission to the
jury. See Spring v. Nagle, 104 Conn. 23, 28, 131 Atil. 744, 745 (1926);
(1926) 35 YALE L. J. 1008. Since each interrogatory must be technically
framed to express a cause of action, there arise complications for court,
counsel, and jury in cases where there are several specifications of negli-
gence for injury, as in an automobile accident case. In view of this the
court in the instant case declares, by way of dictum, that the rule in
such cases as cause complications is to be modified so that an appellant
can take advantage of errors affecting one specification of negligence
only, even though no interrogatories have been submitted. Zimun v.
Whitley, supra at 373, 374. Thus, if there were no wanton misconduct
alleged in the instant case, and error were assigned and found on either
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ground of negligence, appellant would have been protected without having
requested interrogatories.
AnIrriTn ON AnD AWAnD--Ex PAnT. PROCEEDINGs.-A disagreement
arose under a sales contract containing a clause providing for the arbi-
tration of future disputes. The seller demanded an arbitration and, the
defendants having ignored the notice, proceeded, without application to the
court, to secure an ex parte hearing and award under § 4a of the New
York Arbitration Law. The section provides that "'vjhere pursuant to
a provision in a written contract to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising between the parties to the contract.., an award has
been . . . rendered, *without previous application to the supreme court
. . . such an award shall . . . be valid and enforceable according to
its terms, subject, nevertheless to the provisions of this section. At any
time before a final judgment shall have beem given in proceedings to en-
force any such award . . . any party to the arbitration who has not
participated therein may apply to the supreme court . . . to. have all
or any of the issues hereinafter mentioned determined and if . . . the
court... shall determine that no written contract providing for arbitra-
tion was made . . . or that such party was not at fault by failing to
comply with the terms thereof . . .the award shall thereupon become
invalid and unenforceable. . . ." [N. Y. Laws 1927, c. 352, § 4a] From
an order confirming the award, the defendants appealed, alleging that this
section was unconstitutional. Held (one justice dissenting), that the statute
violated due process in that it denied to the defendants the opportunity of
contesting the jurisdiction of the arbitrators unless they refrained from
appearing at the hearing to contest the plaintiffs' claim on the merits.
Judgment reversed. Fisilver, Still, Moss, Inc. v. Goldbcrg, Maaz; & Co.,
N. Y. L. T. Nov. 14, 1929 at 791 (N. Y. App. Div. Ist Dep't).
The fact that an award is rendered on en Varto proceedings does not
ips'o facto render it unenforceable. Such awards have been sustained at
common law and under arbitration statutes having no relevant provisions.
Couch. v. Harison, 68 Ark. 580, 60 S. W. 957 (1901).; Modem System
Ba-erj v. Salisbu?j, 215 Ky. 230, 284 S. W. 994 (1926); Miteubighi v.
Cartens, 116 Wash. 630, 200 Pac. 327 (1921). Some statutes make expreqs
provision for ex parte hearings. CoxN. GmT. STAT. (1918) § 6994; IoWA
CoD. (1927) § 12701; LA. RnV. CODE OF PRAC. (Iarr, 1927). art. 460;
IM1Ass. Cum. STAT. (1927) c. 251, § 18; MnNN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9513.
In New York it had been held, prior to the addition of § 4a to the Arbitra-
tion Law, that where a defendant appeared at an arbitration hearing but
withdrew in protest to the overruling of his objection to the jurisdiction
of the arbitrators, and an award was nevertheless rendered, such an
award -was unenforceable. Bultard vI. Grace, 240 N. Y. 398, 148 X. E.
559 (1925). The result of this decision was to require an order from the
court before an enforceable award could be secured in any arbitration pro-
ceeding. Cf. Bankers' and Shippers' Ins. Co. v. Livcrpool Ins. Co., 24
Lloyds' List Rep. 85 (1926) (House of Lords construed New York Arbitra-
tion Law contra). Section 4a was passed to obviate the rule of Bullard v.
Grace, and sought at the same time expressly to protect a party not
appearing at the hearing. It is to be regretted that a provision inserted
to protect the right of an absent party to contest jurisdiction should be
interpreted as denying the same right to a party appearing. Cf. Chri.t-
Wmn Iv. Meran, 9 Pa. 481 (1848). It is worthy of mention that the court's
attention does not appear to have been called in the instant case to a recent
decision in the sameDepartment where a defendant who contested the claim
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on the merits after objecting to the jurisdiction of the arbitrators was
allowed to raise the question of jurisdiction; in defense to subsequent en-
forcement proceedings. The issue of the constitutionality of § 4a -was
not raised in that case. Marchant v. Mead-Morrison, 226 App. Div. 897,
235 N. Y. Supp. 370 (1st Dep't 1929), aff'd, 252 N. Y. 284 (1930). Of.
Kent v. French, 76 Iowa 187, 40 N. V. 713 (1888). If the interpretation of
the Appellate Division is sustained and the rule of Bullard v. Grace thus
restored, it remains to be seen whether the Court of Appeals will extend
that rule to the facts of the instant case. In the situation involving
non-appearance after due notice received, an ex parte award made
without a previous determination of the issue of jurisdiction, might be
held enforceable even without statutory aid.
BANKS AND BANKING-INSOLVENCY-EXTENT O& PREFERENTIAL CLAIM,.-
The plaintiff sent a note for $2,500 plus interest to the A bank for
collection. The A bank forwarded the note to the defendant bank. While
in a hopelessly insolvent condition, the defendant bank collected the pro-
ceeds from the maker in the form of a check drawn on the defendant
bank. Three days later it was forced to close having $1,118.70 in actual
cash on hand and balances in other banks amounting to $T,676.90. The
plaintiff claimed a preference for the full amount of his note. The
lower court decided that the plaintiff's preference was not limited to
the amount of cash on hand, but extended to the credits of the defendant
bank in other banks. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed.
Lane v. First National Bank of Vale, 281 Pac. 172 (Ore. 1929).
The authorities are agreed that when a bank-with knowledge of its
insolvency receives deposits or makes collections, it is held to be a con-
structive trustee of such funds. Board of Sup'rs v. Prince Edward-Lunon-
burg Co. Bank, 138 Va. 333, 121 Si E. 903 (1924).; Austin w. Lacy, 2
S. W. (2d) 876 *(Tex. Civ. App. 1928); TIFFANY, BANKS AND BANKING
(1912) 349. Assuming that there was a valid trust in the instant case,
to establish a preference by the rule in the federal and in some state
courts, not only must the trust funds be traced into the hands of the
receiver, but it must be shown that the assets received by him were
augmented by the funds sought to be declared trust funds. Mechanics
and Metals Nat. Bank v. Buchanan, 12 F. (2d) 891 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926);
Kirby v. Wait, 120 Kan. 400, 243 Pac. 1058 (1926); Comment (1927)
36 YALE L. J. 682, 685. There is no augmentation if the trust funds
were used to pay debts or other obligations of the bank. Farmer' Nat.
Bank v Pribble, 15 F. (2d) 175 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926)1; Andrew v. State
Bank, 217 N. W. 250 (Iowa 1928). Contra: Thomson v4 Bank of Syra-
cuse, 278 S. W. 810 (Mo. App. 1926). The courts are divided on the
question whether or not a deposit of a check drawn on the insolvent
bank is an augmentation of assets. Union State Ban7 v. People's State
Bank, 211 N. W. 931 (Wis. 1927) (held augmentation); First State
Bank u. O'Bannon, 266 Pac. 472 (Oka. 1928) (same).; Sunderlin v.
Mecosta County Say. Bank, 116 Mich. 281, 74 N. W. 478 (1898) (no
augmentation); Rorebeck v. Benedict Flour & Feed Co., 26 F. (2d) 440
(C. C. A. 8th, 1928) (same). Assuming that there was an augmentation
in the instant case, should the preference have been extended to the credits
of the defendant bank in other banks? There is authbriy to that effect.
Johnson v. Farme's Bank, 11 S. W. (2d) 1090 (Mo. App. 1928); Cent.
Nat. Bank v. FirsA Nat. Bank, 216 N. W. 302 (Neb. 1927); of. State 'V.
Bank of Commerce, 61 Neb. 181, 85 N. W. 43 (1901). !(preference ex-
tended to deposits of insolvent bank in other banks but not to other assets
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of insolvent bank). The Supreme Court of Iowa, most often confronted
by this problem due to the great number of local bank failures, has
repeatedly limited the preference to the amount of cash on hand at the
closing of the bank. Leach v. Battle Creek Say. Bank 219 N. W. 59
(Iowa 1928); Leach . Farmers Trust & Savings Ban!; 217 N. W. 445
(Iowa 1928). That view has been followed in other jurisdictions. Hitt
Firewarks Co. v. Scandinavian Amer. Bank, 121 Wash. 261, 209 Pac.
680 (1922); Grand Forks County -v. Baird, 209 N. W. 7182 (N. D. 1926);
cf. Farmer's Bank v. Bailey, 221 Ky. 55, 297 S. W. 938 (1927). Since
the balance -with a correspondent bank generally is not cash, but a debt
built up by the deposit of commercial paper, by borrowing, and by the
discount of bills receivable, the plaintiff should have been held to be a
general creditor as to the amount of the excess of the trust fund over
the cash on hand. Cf. Skinner v. Porter, 263 Pac. 993 (Idaho 1928).
BANKS AND BANKING-RESPONSIBILITY OF COLLECTING BANK FOR AccEPT-
ING DRAFT IN PAYIENT-EFFECT OF STATUTE AuTHORIZING PAYIENT IN
ExCHANG.-The plaintiff deposited with the defendant bank for collec-
tion a check drawn, on bank A. The defendant forwarded it to bank A
for payment, and received a draft drawn on bank X. This was dishonored
when presented because A had no funds with X. Ieanwhile A had be-
come insolvent. The check was charged by the defendant to the plaintiff's
account The plaintiff thereupon brought suit for negligence in receiving
payment by draft. A statute provided, .. . . all checks drawn on said
banks and trust companies shall, unless specified on the face thereof to
the contrdry by the maker or makers thereof, be payable in exchange drawn
on the reserve deposits of said banks, -when any such check is presented by
or through any Federal Reserve Bank, post office, or ep-ress company
or any respective agent thereof." [N. C. CODE: (1927) § 220 (aa)] The
lower court gave judgment for the defendant. Held, on appeal, that the
judgment be affirmed. Braswell v. Citizens' Nat. Ban7, 197 N. C. 229,
-148 S. E. 236 (1929).
In the absence of statute it iq generally held that a bank accepts at
its peril anything other than money in payment of checks or drafts
deposited for collection. Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U. S. 160,
44 Sup. CL 296 (1924). But in a number of jurisdictions, the collecting
bank is not responsible if it can show a general custom to receive drafts
instead of cash. Cattaruza, v. Bank 146 S. E. (W. Va. 1929); Barnec
v. People's Bank, 194 N. C. 371, 139 S. E. 689 (1927) ; cf. Adams County
v. Meadow Valley Bank, 277 Pac. 575 (Idaho 1929). This same rule
has been applied where checks are presented through the clearings to a
bank in the same city. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. -v. Forest City
State Bank, 227 N. W. 27 (Wis. 1929). But cf. First & Merchant. Nat.
Bank -v. Hampton Bank, 148 S. C. 381, 146 S. D. 219 (1929). In some
jurisdictions it is provided by statute that the collecting bank is not
responsible for accepting a draft in payment. N. Y. CoNs. Laws (MceKin-
ney, 1929) N. I. L. § 350 (h). But such a provision would not relieve
the collecting bank of responsibility to its depositor where it permits
the drawee bank to credit its account and make semi-weekly remittances
by draft. Stone v. Wachovid Bank & Trust Co., 145 S. C. 166, 143 S. E.
27 (1928). The statute in the instant case was not intended to relieve
a collecting bank from responsibility for accepting drafts in payment,
but -was instead intended to prevent the Federal Reserve Banks from
forcing par clearance upon the southern state banks. See Comment (1924)
33 YAla L. 3. 752, '56. The court in the instant case, however, construed
the statute as being applicable and interpreted the phrase "through the
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post-office" broadly to include presentment by mail by banks other than'
the Federal Reserve Banks. Cf. Qualls v. Farmers' & Merohants' Bank,
197 N. C. 438, 440, 149 S. E. 546, 548 (1929); see Comment (1929) 8
N. C. L. Rav. 55. Had the opposite result been reached, the banks, no
doubt, would obtain the same result by stipulating against responsibility.
Such stipulations have generally been upheld. Fergus County v. Federal
Reserve Bank, 75 Mont. 582, 244 Pae. 883 (1926). These decisions
illustrate a remarkable uniform adverse reaction to the common law
rule adopted in the Malloy case.
CONSTITUTIONAL LA W-POLITICAL AFFILIATION AS A PRnRaQUISITE TO
HOLDING OFIc.-A tax-payer brought an action to restrain the city
comptroller from paying the salary of certain justices appointed to'the
Municipal Court under a statute which required "any temporary justice
appointed . . . -(to be) ...a member of the same political party, as the
justice to whose office he has been appointed." [N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 430]
The state constitution, after setting forth the form of oath of office,
provides: "And no other oath, declaration or test shall be. required as a
qualification for any office of public trust." [N. Y. CoNsT. art. 18, § 1]
The lower court denied the injunction. Held, on appeal, that the statute
was unconstitutional in that it made political party membership a qualifica-
tion for appdintment to an office of public trust. Judgment reversed.
S&hieffelin v. Goldsmith, Fontanelli & Bery, 237 N. Y. Supp. 248 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 1929).
In accord with the instant decision, it has been held that a statute
is -inconstitutional which requires the office of police commissioner to be
filled on the recommendation of the members of the municipal council
of the same party as the retiring commissioner. Rafhbone v. Wirth, 150
N. Y. 459, 45 N. E. 15 (1896). Similarly, statutes requiring an equal
number of persons from both leading parties on police and election com-
missions have been held invalid. Att'y General v. Detroit Commorn Counoil,
58 Mich. 213, 24 N. W. 887, (1885); Evansville v. State, 118 Ind. 426,
21 N. E. 267 (1889). But cf. People v. Hoffman, 116 Ill. 587, 8 N. E.
267 (1886). On. the other hand, a statute prohibiting more than two
members from one party on the civil service commission has been up-
held. Rogers v. Buffalo, 123 N. Y. 173, 25 N. E. 274 (1890) '(perhaps
distinguishable from Rathbone v. Wirth, supra, in that it did not require
any member of the commission to be a member of any political party).
It has been suggested that the constitutional prohibition of any additional
"test" applies only to tests of religious belief. Ibid. at 189, 25 N. E.
at 280. Such an interpretation appears historically sound. Cf. 25 CAR.
II, c. 2; 9 GEe. II, c. 26; 4 BLACKSTONE, COMDMNTARiES (Hammond's ed.
1890) 58. Moreover, it seems to have been assumed in New York that
a provision requiring a vacancy in the board of aldermen to be filled
by a person of the same political party as the member whose place has
become vacant is constitutional. Cf. People v. Hogan, 214 N. Y. 216, 108
N. E. 459 (1915). Even though the statute in question is unconstitutional,
it does not necessarily follow that the defendant justices may not recover
the compensation regularly provided for the period of their performance.
Standard Oil Co. v. Henry, 192 Ind. 171, 133 N. E. 742 (1922)- Contra:
Stott v. Chicago, 205 Ili. 281, 68"N. E. 736 (1903); Hill v. Rector, 161
Ark. 574, 256 S. W. 848 (1923). Particularly where one has rendered
the services required under an honest belief in his right to the office,
it is frequently held that as a de facto officer he may recover the pre-
scribed compensation. Erwin v. Jersey City, 60 N. J. L. 141, 37 Atl. 32
(1897) (board which appointed plaintiff city attorney subsequently do-
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dared invalid) ; Wind m, -v. Duluth, 137 Minn. 154, 162 N. W. 1075 '(1917).
Contra: Leerton v. Chambers, 32 Cal. App. 601, 163 Pac. 678 (1917)1;
of. Dolan v. New York, 68 N. Y. 274 (1877) (de jure clerk of district
court awarded compensation for services rendered by the de facto clerk
who had previously ousted him from office and who had not yet been
paid); see People v. Howe, 177 N. Y. 499, 503, 69 N. E. 1114, 1115 (1904)
(approving Dolan %.-New York, supra).
COrNTRCTS-REC0VERy ON IMTLED PROIsa,-PROMISS TO PURHASE ALL
REQUIREMENTS OF BUSINESS CONSTRUED TO INCLUDE PROIzSE TO CONTINUE
IN Busnmss.-A contract provided that the plaintiff, an Ohio manufac-
turer of caustic soda products, should lend $100,0O0 to the defendant,
which used these products in its Philadelphia factory, for erection by
the defendant in Ohio of a plant capable of taling care of its entire
business. The contract also stipulated that the plaintiff should furnish
and the defendant should buy from the plaintiff all the soda products
required in the defendant's business for a period of five Years, within
which period the defendant's debt was to be repaid. Before the defendant
had moved its business to Ohio, it sold its Philadelphia plant to another
company and contracted not to compete with it for five years. In a suit
by the plaintiff to cancel this contract, and for other relief, the lower
court dismissed the bill for want of equity. Held, on appeal, that the
plaintiff was entitled to damages for the defendant's breach of an implied
promise to continue in business for five years. Judgment reversed.
Diamond Alkali Co. v. Tomson and Co., 35 F. (2d) 117 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929).
The courts will generally imply into a contract those promises and
conditions which, though not expressed, were obviously within the inten-
tion of the parties as determined by the terms of the contract and the
circumstances surrounding its execution. See Ross v. Morrima Vctwcr
Co., 129 Miss. 693, 704, 92 So. 823, 824 (1922); 3 WiLLIsoN, CONTRACTS
(1920) § 1293. An apparent obligation will not be implied vhere it
conflicts with an express provision of the contract. Walter R. Cliffo Co.
w. DuPont Engineering Co., 298 Fed. 649 (D. Del. 1924). And some courts
seem to imply a negation of implication: where the terms of the contract
are set ftorth in great detail. Cf. Prest v. Inhabitants of Farmington, 117
le. 348, 104 AtL 521 (1918); McPherson -v. Gudkit Gin Co., 134 Miss.
771, 100 So. 16 (1924). But even in a detailed contract an omission
which is obviously an oversight will be supplied by implication. Brumley
-v. McCormack, 17 S. W. (2d) 597 (Mo. 1929). A promise not to hinder
or prevent the plaintiff's performance is frequently implied. Patterson v.
Meyerhofor, 204 N. Y. 96, 97 N. E. 47"2 (1912); Aroop v. Scala, 5 I. 3.
Misc. 89, 135 AtI. 501 (1927). Similarly, against a defense of impossibility,
the courts will imply a promise by the defendant not to make his own
performance impossible. Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Transportation
Co. v. Scranton Coal Co., 239 Fed. 603 (C. C. A. 7th, 1917); Proctor -V.
Union Coal Co., 243 Mass. 428, 137 N. B. 659 (1923).; of. Du Pont do
Neimour Powder Co. v. Schlottman, 218 Fed. 353 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914)
(court implied promise by defendant not to make impossible of occurrence
a condition on which rested the defendant's duty to perform). In many
instances, the promise is implied on the part of the plaintiff, as considera-
tion for the defendant's express promise, in order to make the contract
binding. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88, 118 N. E.
214 (1917); Phelps v. La Salle Hotel Co., 209 Il. App. 430 (1918);
cf. Parish, Coal Co. -. Waid, 21 Ala. App. 593, 110 So. 321 (1926)
(promise by defendant implied in order to make contract binding). Where,
as in the instant case, the promise implied is instead the basis of the
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action, it would seem that the necessity of accurately estimating the
damages would require that the implied promise be constructed as strictly
as possible without precluding a reasonable 'ecovery. Thus the instant
court, in an otherwise commendable decision, might well have implied a
promise by the defendant to buy from the plaintiff for at least five years
raw materials equal in amount to the normal requirements of its business,
rather than so indefinite and personal a promise as to continue in business
for five years. Cf. 'Wells v. Alezandre, 130 N. Y. 642, 29 N. E. 142 (1891)
(contract to buy and sell coal necessary to run certain steamboats for one
year held breached by sale of boats, court implying promise "to take the
coal which the ordinary and accustomed use of the steamers required").
CoRPORATIoNs--AsSESS=NTS ON FuL-PAmD SHARES OF NON-PsOFIT
CORPORAIONS.-The share certificates of a mutual non-profit corporation
engaged in distributing water for irrigation purposes to its several share-
holders recited that the shares were subject to the by-laws and to assess-
ments for construction and maintenance. The by-laws provided for the
levying of assessments by the directors, and for the sale of delinquent
shares upon failure to pay such assessments within six months after
they were due. In an action by the corporation to recover assessments
levied, the lower court allowed a personal judgment against the defendant,
an owner of four full-paid shares. Held, 6n- appeal, that the judgment
be affirmed. Big Creek Ditch Go. v. Hulick, 280 Pac. 492 (Ore. 1929).
It is generally held that there can be no valid levy of assessments on
full-paid shares in the absence of a promise by a shareholder to pay,
or of a provision therefor in a statute or in the articles of incorporation.
Schuet v. Farmers' Union Mill & Grain Co., 116 Neb. 14, 215 N. W.
458 (1927); 6 THOIiPSON, CORPORATIONS (1927) § 4820. Similarly non-
stock corporations cannot enforce assessments in excess of the amount
promised, or called for by the charter or articles of association. DZluth
Club v. MacDonald, 74 Minn. 254, 76 N. W. 1128 (1896)1; see Omaha Law
Library Ass'n v. Connell, 55 Neb. 396, 398, 75 N. W. 837, 838 (1898).
This is true even though the corporation's very existence depends upon
the funds to be so raised. Duluth Club v,. MacDonald, supra; of. Sullivan
Club v. Butler, 26 Misc. 306, 56 N. Y. Supp. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1899). And
where the state has not reserved power to amend the corporation's charter,
a statute authorizing the levying of assessments on existing full-paid shares
is unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of contracts. Vnterpriso
Ditch Co. v. Moffltt, 58 Neb. 642, 79 N. W. 560 (1899); Gare/ v. St. Joe
Mining Co., 32 Utah 497, 91 Pac. 369, 12 L. R. A. (N. s.) 554 (1907).
But a shareholder is subject to assessment where provision is made there-
for in the certificate of incorporation. Forsyth v. Selma Mines Go., 58
Utah 142, 197 Pac. 586 (1921); Melville v. Rhodes, 136 Wash. 200, 239
Pac. 560 (1925). And an agreement between all the shareholders to
an assessment is likewise enforceable. Milton v. Bergstrom, 71 Fla. 197,
70 So. 1008 (1916); Jonas v'. Frost, 32 Idaho 214, 179 Pac. 949 (1919).
And a shareholder accepting a share certificate containing a provision
for such assessment, as in the instant case, is bound thereby. Blue Mt.
Forest As'n v. Barrowe, 71 N. H. 69, 51 At]. 670 (1901); Payette-Boiso
Water Users' Assn v,. Fairchild, 35 Idaho 97, 205 Pac. 258 (1922). As
to whether a provision for assessments in the by-laws existing at the
time of the purchase of shares would be ipso facto enforceable, quro.
Cf. Omaha Law Librarj Assn v. Butter, supra at 898, 75 X. W. at
838; Sullivan Club v. Butler, supra at 309, 56 N. Y. Supp. at 3. The
instant court's conclusion that the corporation could recover in a personal
action against the defendant, although the by-laws provided for forfeiture
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and sale of the shares on nonpayment of the assessment, is not in accord
with the holdings of other courts. Dotson -v. Hogan, 44 Utah 295, 140
Pac. 128 (1914) (similar *by-law held to restrict corporation's remedy
to sale of the delinquent shares); Payette-Boin Water Uscrs' Ass'n v.
Fairchild, supra; Quintet Oil Co. -v. Big Five Oil Co., 205 Pac. 949 (Colo.
1922).
COPORLATIONS-NON-C MULATIvE PREFERRED SHAREs-CLAlt To Dim-
VEMNS EARNmE BUT UN=EmCAnmz-The complainants were holders of Class
A shares of the defendant railway corporation, which were non-cumulative,
participating, with voting rights equal to the Class B and common shares,
and "entitled to receive preferential dividends in each fiscal year up to
the amount of five per cent before any dividends shall be paid" on the
junior shares. From 1915 to 1925 net earnings amounting to $16,000,000
were used for working capital and improvements, at the discretion of
the directors, no dividends being paid. In 1927 and 1928, the directors
proposed to declare a dividend to the junior shareholders out of the
current earnings alone, in addition to the full five per cent on the Class
A shares. The complainants sued to enjoin this declaration on the
gound that the amount of the preferential dividends earned but not
declared in the previous years must first be distributed. A decree dis-
missing the bill was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Barclay
v. Wabash RBj., 30 F. (2d) 260 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929). Hc, on certforari,
that the decree Ed reversed. The Court said that "if profits are justifiably
applied . . . to capital improvements and no dividend is declared within
the year, the claim for that year is gone" under "the common and reason-
able understanding" of the word non-cumulative, regardless of the oppor-
tunity for abuse of the preferred shareholders by biased directors. Wabash
By. v. Barclay and Willoughby Co., U. S. Daily, Jan. 9, 1929, at 7 (U. S.
Sup. Ct.).
The problem of the legal incidents of non-cumulative preferred shares
has been extensively commented upon. Berle, Non-Cumulativo Preferrcd
Stock (1923). 23 CoL. L. R-v. 358; Comment (1925) 34 YAME L. T. 657;
Note (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. RBv. 605; Note (1925) 23 MICH. L. 1IEv. 779;
Note (1925) 11 VA. L. Rav. 553. And the decision of the lower court
in the instant case, together with the precedents and the opposing view,
has been the subject of additional recent discussion. (1929) 38 YAMM L. J.
820 (approving the view adopted by the Supreme Court as being 'more
consistent with the usual conception of non-cumulative stocL'); Note
(1929) 42 HARv. L. REv. 805; Note (1929) 14 CORN. L. Q. 341. The lower
court, in holding that until dividends of prior earnings have been declared
to the non-cumulative shareholders, the common shareholders may not
receive dividends of current earnings to which they would otherwise be
entitled, seems to have gone further than the previous cases. Note (1929)
14 CORN. L. Q. 341. It is to be noted that the directors of the defendant
corporation were as extensively interested in the Class A shares as in
the common, thus eliminating any personal desire to abuse their discretion
as to payment of dividends to the advantage of the common share-
holders. This latter possibility seems to have been uppermost in the minds
of the lower court and those who support its result. Berle, op. cit
supra. In addition, it is possible that the right of the Class A shareholders
to participate in earnings with the common, by enabling them to benefit
directly from capital improvements and wise administration, presents a
stronger case against them in this action. The instant decision may have
the desirable result of preventing, as a practical matter, the creation of
non-cumulative shares without express provision for the incidents thereof.
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CORPORATIONS-PURCHASE OP SHARES FROM SHAREHOLDER BY DIREOTOR-
DuTY TO DISCLOSE KNOWLEDGE OF PROBABLE INCREASE IN VALUE-Tho de-
fendant -was a director, president and chairman of the executive committee
of a corporation in -which the complainant was a shareholder and director.
The complainant brought a bill in equity for an accounting and other
relief, alleging that the defendant, knowing that a merger was imminent
which, if consummated, would increase the value of the shares to at least
$2500 each, purchased the holdings of the complainant for $1400 a share;
that the defendant did not disclose his tnowledge of the proposed merger,
concerning which the complainant was ignorant; and that upon completion
of the merger the value of the shares increased to more than $3000.
Held, that a motion to strike out the bill be granted. Connolly v. Shan-
non, 147 Atl. 234 (N. J. 1929).
It is frequently stated that a director owes no duty to a shareholder to
disclose to the latter, before purchasing his shares, facts which the
director may know affecting their value. Walker, The Dtty of Disclosu'ro
by a Director Purchasing Stocl From His Stockholders (1923) 32 YAIE L.
T. 637; (1925) 10 CORN. L. Q. 509; (1927) 25 MDiic. L. RBv. 459. This
strict rule has been applied in a few cases. Board of Comm. v. Reynolds,
44 Ind. 509 (1873) ; Grantv. Attrill, 11 Fed. 469 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1882) ;
Shaw v. Cole Mfg. Co., 132 Tenn. 210, 177 S. W. 479 (1915). In some
cases which express adherence to the strict rule, the decision can readily
be justified by the peculiar facts involved. Hooker v. Midland Steel Co.,
215 Ill. 444, 74 N. E. 445 (1905) (director offered to return shares at
price paid, with interest); Bacon v. Sotle, 19 Cal. App. 428, 126 Pac.
384 (1912) (parties bitter enemies); Stout v. Cunningham, 33 Idaho
464, 196 Pac. 208 (1921) (plaintiff's claim barred by statute of limita-
tions). Recent cases disclose a tendency to depart from the rule. Thus
in many cases the courts, although denying relief, take pains to demon-
strate either that the purchasing director had no peculiar knowledge,
or that his silence did not in fact prejudice the shareholder. Krumbbaar
v. G-fflths, 151 Pa. 223, 25 AtI. 64 (1892); Haarstick v. Fox, 9 Utah
110, 33 Pac. 251 (1893); Steinfeld v. Niels n; 15 Ariz. 424, 139 Pac. 879
(1913); Percival v. W7ight, [1902] 2 Ch. 421; of. Bowden v. Taylor, 254
Ill. 464, 98 N. E. 941 (1912). Furthermore, some courts have made
exceptions to -the rule on the grounds that the director was acting as
the "agent," or "trustee" of the seller, or was engaged with him in a
joint undertaking. Dutton v. Barnes, 162 MIinn. 430, 203 N. W. 414
(1925); Gadsden 'u. Bennetto, 9 D. L. R. 719 (1913); Allen v. Hyatt, 17
D. L. R. 7 (1914); of. Mulvane v. O'Brien, 58 Kan. 463, 49 Pae. 607
(1897) ; Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76 Atl. '7 (1910).
It may be questioned whether such a fiduciary relation would have been
discovered in the absence of the director's duplicity. Some courts, while
recognizing the rule that no duty of disclosure exists, grant relief where
there is a fhilure to disclose "exceptional" facts not appearing on the
books of the company. Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419, 29 Sup. Ct.
521 (1909); Gamotnin. Dam, 238 Mich. 30., 212 N. W. 957 (1927). But
of. Board of Comm. v. Reynolds, supra. Finally, in some jurisdictions
there has been a clear repudiation of the old rule. Oliver v. Oliver, 118
Ga. 362, 45 S. E. 232 (1903)1; Stewart . Haris, 69 Kan. 498, 77 Pac.
277 (1904); Jacquith v. Mason, 99 Neb. 509, 156 N. W. 1041 (1916);
Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 157 N. W. 929 (1916);
of. Poole v. Camden, 79 W. Va. 310, 92 S. E. 454 (1917); Colo. Laws
1927, c. 81, §7(b).
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CosTs-CouNTERcLAmIS.-In an action at law the defendant was found
indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $8,994.35. In a counterclaim the
plaintiff was found indebted to the defendant for $9,422.61. Judgment
was entered in favor of the defendant for $428.26. In entering fnal
judgment the question of taxation of costs arose. Held, that the plaintiff
pay all costs and that the defendant be reimbursed for the costs he ex-
pended. Harlan Coal Co. v. North American Coal Co., 35 F. (2d). 211
(N. D. Ohio 1929).
The pievailing party in an action at law is entitled to costs as of right.
I Unted States . Schurz, 102 U. S. 378, 407 (1880).; U. S. REV. STAT. § 983
(1889), 28 U. S. C. § 830 (1926). Where the suit includes more than
one cause of action, the prevailing party is the one in whose favor the
decision or verdict is rendered and judgment entered. Unitc States -r.
Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. RB., 235 Fed. 951 (D. Minn. 1916). All
costs, whether incurred in the successful cause of action or not, are taxed
against the losing party. Tefft v. Stern, 74 Fed. '755 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896) ;
Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Pearce, 253 Fed. 960 (C. C. A. 'th, 1918). But
cf. United States v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., supra, Such costs
cannot be apportioned by the court between the parties. Ez prte Petcr-
son, 253 U. S. 300, 40 Sup. Ct. 543 (1920); Tinidad Asphalt Co. V.
Robinson, 52 Fed. 347 (E. D. Mich. 1892); Wlweler v. Taft, 261 Fed. 978
(C. C. A. 5th, 1920); Bartels v. Redfield, 47 Fed. 708 (S. D. N. Y. 1891).
In the instant case the defendant's disbursements for the independent
cause of action which he lost were taxed against the plaintiff. Cf. Wfliams
v. Morrison, 32 Fed. 682 (E. D. Mo. 1887); In Toc Peterson, supra. The
state practice is the same. Shannon -v. Stratton, 144 Ky. 26, 137 S. W.
850 (1911); Lykins v. Hemrick 144 Ky. 80, 137 S. W. 852 (1911); Orza
v. Haley, 141 Mo. App. 637, 125 S. W. 556 (1910); Beaton v. Radford,
40 .Ohio St. 106 (1883); Gordon v. Steinmetz, 71 Ohio St. 372, '73 X. E.
512 (1905); Rohrs v. Rohms, 72 Misc. 108, 130 N. Y. Supp. 1093 (Sup.
Ct. 1911). Contra: Louisville Ry. v. Cofer, 110 Ala. 491, 18 So. 110 (1895).
The losing party in the suit thus pays the costs not only of the litigation
for which he is thus declared "responsible," but also of that in which he is
in the right. The inarticulate theory of the American courts is the
English theory that costs should be a penalty and a deterrent to litiga-
tion. See United State v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. By., supra at
953; Steve= v. Central Nat. Bank, 168 N. Y. 566, 61 X. E. 904, 906
(1901). But the haphazard rule that costs follow the judgment as a
matter of course does not exist in England. Goodhart, Costs (1929) 38
YALE L. J. 849. Full discretion is there allowed the judge where the
case is tried -without a jury. RULES OF COURT (1883) Order 65, rule 1.
And even in jury trials where costs ordinarily follow the judgment, costs
may at the discretion of the judge be apportioned otherwise "for good
reason." Order 65, rule 1; cf. American National Bankv a. Commercial Na-
tionaZl Bank, 268 Fed. 688 (S. D. Ga. 1920) (American equity practice sim-
ilar). Where the case includes independent causes of action, the costs spe-
eifically incurred in each action may go to the party who succeeds in it,
although the losing party pays the "general" costs of the entire action.
Reid, Hewitt and Co. v. Joseph, [1918] A. C. 717. The harshness of the in-
stant decision illustrates the necessity in this country of a consciously
planned system of costs. See Goodhart, op. cit. supra.
FUTURE INTERESTS-DEVISE OvER ON DEATH WITHOUT IssuE.-Testatrix
made a devise of real property to her grandson and in the event of his
"dying without leaving issue to survive him," to her heirs at law. After
the death of the testatri: her administrators were compelled to sell the
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property to pay some of her debts. They then filed a bill in equity for
instructions as to disposition of the proceeds. The grandson de-
fended, claiming absolute title to the proceeds on the ground that the devise
gave him an estate in fee simple in the property and that the limitation
over was void for remoteness. Held, that the words "dying without leaving
issue to survive him" refer to a definite, not an indefinite, failure of issue,
and that the defendant; takes the proceeds subject to a limitation over
contingent on his dying without issue living at the time of his death.
Delaware Trust Co. v. Elliott, 147 AtI. 244 (Del. 1929).
At common law, where there was a devise to "A and if he should die
without issue, over to B," the words "die without issue" were presumed to
:iean an indefinite failure of issue and the remainder to B did not vest until
A's issue became extinct. This arbitrary interpretation was adopted
to further the creation of estates, tail, which restricted the alienation of
land in the interests of the feudal landholders, after the passage of the
statute De Donis Conditionalibus in 1285. Later an executory devise over
after an indefinite failure of issue was held to violate the rule against
perpetuities. GRAVES, REAL PROPERTY (1912) § 221; GRAY, RULE AGAINST
PmFPEUITxES (3d ed. 1915) §§ 153-158; 1 TihFANY, REAL PR o RTY (1920)
§§ 23, 26; Warren, Gifts Over on Death Without Issue (1929) 39 YALE
L. J. 332. Statutes in England and many of the states have since made
the -words "die without issue" presumptive of a definite and not an in-
definite failure of issue. 1 VICT. c. 26, § 29 (1837); MASS. GEN. LAWS
(1921) c. 184, § 6; Mic..Cohi'. LAws (Cahill, 1915) § 11540; N. J. Comp.
STAT. (1910) p. 5870; N. Y. ANN. CONS. LAWS (2d ed. 1917) p. 7306;
R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) § 4290; VA. GEN. LAWS (1923) § 5151. In only
six states are estates tail recognized today. Hazzard v. Hazzard, 28 Del.
502, 94 At]. 905 (1915); Iisman .. Marks, 126 Kan. 345, 267 Pac. 963
(1928); McCarthy v. Walsh, 123 Me. 157, 122 At]. 406 (1923); Gilkio
-v. Marsh, 186 Mass. 336, 71 N. E.'703 (1904); Saokett v. Paine, 46 It. 1.
439, 128 Atl. 209 (1925); WYo. Coip. STAT. ANN. (1920) c. 382, art.
4. And in at least two of these states, Delaware and Maine, the common
law presumption that an indefinite failure of issue is intended still pre-
vails. Caulk v. Caulk, 3 Pennew. 528, 52 At. 340 (Del. 1902) ; FAisk v. Keene,
35 Me. 349 (1853); McCarthy v. Walsh, supra. Where entails have been
abolished there remains no justification for the common law presumption,
but in some instances the old rule is still blindly adhered to. Quilliam
v. Union Trust Co., 194 Ind1 521, 142 N. E. 214 (1924). Since entails
tend to restrict alienation, they are not to be favored and the old presump-
tion, without serving any useful purpose, subjects executory devises con-
tingent on "death without issue" to the rule against perpetuities. By
giving to the words "die without issue" an ordinary rather than a fictitious
meaning, the law of wills'will be simplified without any deleterious results.
The difficulty which the instant court appears to have experienced in
reaching its decision illustrates the misunderstanding of this subject, be-
cause even at common law a gift over on death "without leaving issue
surviving" the first taker was considered a definite failure. Portor v.
Bradley, 3 T. R. 143 (1789); Nicholson v. Bettle, 5'T Pa. 384 (1868).
LANDLORD AND TENANT-ACTS CONSTITUTING CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION.-
In an action for rent, the tenant set up a defense of constructive eviction,
alleging that from the landlord's rooms directly below his own there issued
regularly from 10 P. M. to 1 A. Mt. noises of rattling dishes and garbage
cans, and loud talking; and that the plaintiff had mimicked and insulted
his wife and daughter. After five months on the premises, the defendant
notified the plaintiff ot hid intention to vacate on account of the noise,
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which he did two months later, having paid the rent for eight of the
thirteen months of the lease. Held, that the disturbances -were not suf-
ficiently "grave and permanent" to constitute a constructive eviction, and
that the tenant's continued occupancy following the acts complained of
would, in any event, have been a waiver of his "privilege" to quit. Ellis
v. McDermott, 147 At]. 236 (N. J. 1929).
Acts done or suffered to be done by the landlord by which the lessee's
premises are rendered "untenantable" are said to constitute a construc-
tive eviction, relieving a tenant -who immediately vacates of further duty
to pay rent. North Pacfic S. S. Co. -v. Terninal Co., 43 Cal. App. 182,
185 Pac. 205 (1919) ; see Schulte Realtij Co. -V. Puvijina, 179 N. Y. Supp.
371, 372 (Sup. Ct. 1919). Unless his abandonment of possession ensues
very shortly upon the disturbances complained of, however, the tenant
is frequently held to have -vaived the privilege. Eagle -u. Matthcwo, 98
Ran. 715, 160 Pac. 211 "(1916) (11 months too long); Mallard v. Duke, 131
S. C. 175, 126 S. E. 525 (1925) (13 months too long). But cf. Batcman V.
Levenson, 102 Misc. 92, 168 N. Y. Supp. 197 (1917) (rats of -which tenant
had complained increased in number); Pcg-F-recman v. Murphy, 164
N. Y. Supp. 74 (Sup. Ct. 1917) (eviction through failure to furnish heat
held renewed after iach monthly payment by tenant); Hartcnbaucr -V.
Brumbaugh, 220 l. App. 326 (1920) (tenant allowed lessor several months
to remove prostitutes on floor above). The acts required to constitute a
constructive eviction are by no means uniformly' defined. Failure to
furnish heat, hot -water, power, or elevator service-where these are to
be expected by the terms of the lease-usually constitutes eviction. Rus-
sell '. Olson, 22 X. D. 420, 133 N. W. 1030 (1911); Conroy v,. Toomay,
234 Mass. 384, 125 N. B. 568 (1920); Hayden Co. V. Tchoo, 177 App.
Div. 734, 164 X. Y. Supp. 686 (2d Dep't 1917); Buchanan %. Orange, 118
-Va. 511, 88 S. E. 52 (1916) ; of. Morgan, v. Cook 213 Ill. App. 112 (1919).
Leaking roofs, plumbing -which permits water and filth to seep into the
premises, and vermin, have been similarly considered. Smit. -v. Grecn-
stone, 208 S. W. 628 (Mo. App. 1918); 'rausi . Fifo, 120 App. Div. 490,
105 N. Y. Supp. 384 (2d Dep't 1907); Barnard Realty Co. v. Benwft, 155
App. Div. 182, 139 N. Y. Supp. 1050 (1st Dep't 1913). Personal affronts
by the lessor to the tenant or members of his family have frequently been
held to amount to a constructive eviction. Purcell 'a. Lemon, 83 Misc. 5,
144 N. Y. Supp. 348 (1st Dep't 1913),; Teighdce V. Mullcr, 51 Pa. Super.
Ct. 125 (1912). But cf. Greenwald v. Schustk, 169 N. Y. Supp. 98 (Sup.
Ct. 1918) (insulting language to tenant's daughter by elevator boy ceased
after complaint). Where the acts complained of are those of third per-
sons, generally only such as are instigated by the landlord Wi
amount to an eviction. See JONES, LAMLORD AND TENANT (1906) §
354. But if lewd or immoral activities are carried on in halls or neighboring
apartments which are under the lessor's control, the tenant may consider
himself evicted. Milheim -v. Baxter, 46 Colo. 155, 103 Pac. 376 (1909);
Phyfe v. Dale, 72 Alisc. 383, 130 N. Y. Supp. 231 (Sup. Ct 1911). The
cases seem divided on the issue of whether mere noise on premises under
the landlord's control may amount to an eviction. Bausfa& '. Pincus,
47 Mont. 202, 131 Pac. 1064 (1913) (eviction: lessor constructed public
garage net to tenant); Hannan '. Harper, 189 Wis. 588, 208 X. W. 255
(1926) (eviction- landlord rented floor above tenant to college fraternity);
Woods Theatrev . North. A m. Udon, 246 Ill App. 521 (1927) (no eviction:
tenant's employees distracted -when lessor leased adjoining rooms to music
publisher); McKMinn v. Browning, 126 App. Div. 370, 140 X. Y. Supp.
562 (2d Dep't 1908) (no eviction: landlord allowed tenant above to keep
dog which barked frequently). It seems apparent that the type of:
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neighborhood must play an unusually large part in the determination of
these cases. A reconciliation of the decisions on a basis of the printed
reports is scarcely to be expected.
PLEADrNG-AmENDED COmPLAINTS-STATUTE oF LIMITATIONS.-Th de-
fendant was made a party in an action brought under the Jones Act for in-
juries resulting from the defendant's negligence, within three years after
the cause of action arose but after the two year period of limitations pre-
scribed by the Jones Act had elapsed. [41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 7J. S. 0. §
688 (1926)] The plaintiff filed an amended complaint more than three years
after the injury setting up an action at common law, on which the limita-
tion period -was three years. [N. Y. C. P. A. § 49] The defendant moved
to dismiss the amended complaint. Held, that the amendment stated a
new cause of action against the defendant and was barred. D'Allesandro
v. United Marine Contracting Corp., 30 F. (2d) 718 (E. D. N. Y. 1928).
The usual theory is that -where an amended complaint sets up a now
cause of action, the statute of limitations continues to run until the amend-
ment is filed. 2 WoOD, LIirATioN OF ACTiONS (4th ed 1916) 1526. It
has been held that a, recovery under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act may be had without amendment though the statute was not pleaded,
so long as the allegations of fact in the complaint are sufficient to meet
the requirements of the statute. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Duvall, 225
U. S. 477, 32 Sup. Ct. 790 (1912). And the same result has been reached
even though the necessary facts were not all alleged but were merely
brought out on the trial. Toledo, St. Louis and Western By. v. Slavin,
236 U. S. 454, 35 Sup. Ct. 306" (1915); St. Louis, San Fhancisco & Tcxas
Ry. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156, 33 Sup. Ct. 651 (1913). Where, as in the
above cases, it is deemed unnecessary for the plaintiff to amend and allege
the theory of his action, but a plaintiff does so amend, there is no ap-
- parent reason for penalizing the plaintiff or protecting the defendant by
continuing the running of the statute of limitations. Most of the cases
are in accord with this reasoning. Lamnars v. Chicago, Gt. W. Ry., 187
Iowa 1277, 175 N. W. 311 (1919) (original complaint sought common law
recovery, did not set up Federal Employers' Liability Act but did allege
sufficient facts thereunder; amendment asked judgment under the act;
held not new cause of action for purpose of statute of limitations) ; Sea-
board Air Line Ry. v. Rena, 241 U. S. 290, 36 Sup. Ct 567 (1916). (original
complaint alleged facts sufficient only for common law action; amendment
sought recovery under Federal Employers' Liability Act; held not new
cause of action for purpose of statute of limitations); N. Y. Central v.
Kinney, 260 U. S. 340, 43 Sup. Ct. 122 (1922) (same); Kinney v. Hud-
son River Ry., 98 Misc. 11 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1916) (same); Smith v.
Atlantic- Coast Line Ry., 210 Fed. 761 (C. C. A. 4th, 1913) (same).
Contra: Hogarty v. Phila. and Reading By., 255 Pa. 236, 99 At. £741
(1916) (original complaint alleged facts sufficient only for common law
action); Bowrow v. Chicago etc. Ry., 206 ll. App. 287 (1917) (same);
Carpenter v. Central Vt. Ry., 93 Vt. 357, 107 Atl. 569 (1919) (same).
And such reasoning would produce a contrary result in the instant case.
Of. Wabash Ry. v. Hayes, 234 U. S. 86, 34 Sup. Ct. 729 (1914) (complaint
sought recovery under Federal Employers' Liability Act; plaintiff failed
to prove necessary facts at trial; held, that common law recovery could
be had without amending). It has been held that an amended com-
plaint sets up a new cause of action if the new allegation deprives the
defendant of some substantive defense which he had to the original
complaint. Card v. Stowers Pork-Packing & Provision Co., 253 Pa. 575,
98 Ati. 728 (1916). Since most employers' liability statutes abolish some
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of the common law defenses, a change from a common law to a statutory
proceeding might frequently under this test be considered the commence-
ment of a new cause of action. But even such a test would not justify
a similar holding in the converse situation presented in the instant case.
DRmGm AND DxvoRC--FORSGN DErc AS BAn To Sur Fo AzLmoNY.-
While an action for alimony was pending in Ohio, the plaintiff's husband
obtained a divorce in Nevada, both parties appearing in that action. The
defendant husband set up the Nevada decree as a bar to the action
for alimony; but the lower court gave judgment for the plainti'E onj the
ground that the issue of alimony had not been raised in the prior action.
Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed. Metzgcr -v. Metzgcr, 167
N. E. 690 (Ohio Ct. of App. 1929).
A divorce, obtained on constructive service by a wife, is generally
no bar to a subsequent suit for alimony in the same or a sister state since
the divorce court had no jurisdiction to render a personal judgment for
alimony. Spradling v. Sprading, 74 Okla. 276, 181 Pac. 148 (1919);
Hutton .Dodge, 58 Utah 228, 198 Pac. 165 (1921); see Weidman- v.
Weidman, 57 Ohio St. 101, 103, 48 N. E. 506, 507 (1897)- Contra:
McCoy v. McCoy, 191 Iowa 973, 183 N. W. 377 (1921); Darby V. Darby,
152 Tenn. 287, 277 S. W. 894 (1925). And where the husband secured
a divorce in like manner, a later suit for alimony by the wife was allowed.
Tmoncay v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 131 S. W. 977 (1910) (wife had no
opportunity to apply for alimony); Davis v. Davis, 70 Colo. 37, 197 Pac.
241 (1921). Contra: Hughes . Hughes, 211 Ky. 799, 278 S. W. 121 (1925) ;
see Hazard v. Hazard, 197 D1l. App. 612, 614 (1916)- But some jurisdictions
bar the subsequent alimony action, even where only one party appeared in
the divorce action, arguing that after the marriage relation is severed
the wife is in the position of a stranger. Hughes v. Hughwe, "upra;
Watson v. Wats n, 148 S. E. 386 (Ga. 1929). And where both parties
appeared and the issue of alimony was determined, a later suit for alimony
is barred whether the action is brought in the same state or in a sister
state. Phillips -v. Phillips, 69 Kan. 324, 76 Pac. 842 (1904); Gilbert -v.
Gilbert, 33 Ohio St. 265, 94 N. E. 421 (1911); see Eldred -v. Eldred, 62
Neb. 613, 616, 87 N. W. 340, 341 (1901). Likewise, -where the question
of alimony was not passed upon, it has been held reS judicat in a later
action in the same state od the ground that it is an issue which could
have been raised in the previous action. Weidman . Weidman, supra;
Cameron -v. Cameron, 31 S. D. 335, 140 N. W. 700 (1913) ; see Petersino v.
Thomas, 28 Ohio St. 596, 601 (1876); of. Sweeney v. Sweeney, 42 Nev.
431, 438, 179 Pac. 638, 639 (1919). Where the second suit is in another
state, this question appears to be treated as one governed by the law of
the forum. But the United States Supreme Court has suggested that if
alimony is -es iudicata in the state of the divofce suit, it must also be
res judicata in a sister state which recognizes the divorce. See Bate- v.
Bodie, 245 U. S. 520, 526, 38 Sup. Ct. 182, 184 (1918). And, as a rule,
* judgments secured in a sister statd are held rcs judicata as to matters
of defense and counterclaim. that might have arisen in the prior action.
Holman -uz. Tjosevig, 136 Wash. 261, 239 Pac. 545 (1925) ; Gr crcbaum Son'c
Bank & Trust Co. v. Porth, 116 Kan. 310, 326, 226 Pac. 747 (1924).
Aforeover, inasmuch as both Ohio and Nevada appear to hold a subsequent.
suit for alimony T'es Judrata, it is suggested that the instant court should




TAXATION-APPLcABILITY OF SuccEssIoN TAX TO Imn VoABIE TRUSTS
CREATED BEFORE ENACTMENT OF TAX STATUTE--AnI irrevocable trust was
established in which the income was reserved for the lives of the settlors,
the remainder to be divided among their five sons, or, if a son predeceased
the surviving settlor, his share to go to his heirs. The trust was established
before a statute went into effect levying an excise tax on the passing of
property by such a trust "made or intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment after [the settlor's] death." [MASS. GEN. LAWvS (1921) c.
65, § 1] Upon the death of the last settlor the lower court held the trust
subject to the tax then in force. Held, on appeal, that the judgment
be affirmed. Coolidge v. Commissioner of Taxation and Corporations, 167
N. E. 757 (Mass. 1929).
In the case of a revocable trust it is said that the succession does not
take place until the death of the settler, and tax statutes enacted after
the creation of the trust) but in force at the death of the settler are applica-
ble. Sattonstall v. Saltonstall, 27G U. S. 260, 48 Sup. Ct. 225 (1928);
Matter of Dana, 215 N. Y. 461, 109 N. E. 557 (1915) ; Lines' Estate, 155
Pa. 378, 26 Atl. 728 (1893); (1928) 41 HARv. L. REV. 916. The instant
court, in applying the same rule to an irrevocable trust, runs counter
to the prevailing doctrine. Brown v. Penn. Co., 2 Harr. 525, 126
Atl. 715 (Del. 1924). The rule of the majority cases is based on the theory
that an irrevocable grant of a remainder interest is a present "transfer"
and the tax law applicable is the one in force at the time -when the trust
is created. Blodgett v. Union and Now Haven Trust Co., 97 Conn. 405,
110 Atl. 908 (1922); Matter of Webber, 151 App. Div. 539, 136 N. Y.
Supp. 83 (2d D ep't 1912); In re Houston's Estate, 276 Pa. 330, 120 Atl.
267 (1923); Keeny v. New York, 222 U. S. 525, 32 Sup. Ct. 105 (1912).
It has even been, suggested that the tax could be collected at the time of the
transfer instead of at the settler's death. See Matter of Mescrolo, 98
Misc. 105, 106, 162 N. Y. Supp. 414, 415 (Surr. Ct. 1916).. The instant
court says that the tax is on the "succession" and that the "succession"
does not take place until the beneficiary gains full and unrestricted con-
trol of the fund. The test of "possession and enjoyment after (settlor's]
death" is thus used not only to determine that the trust is one which is
subject to the tax but also to determine the time, for purposes of taxation,
when the property passes. See Comment (1929) 38 YALE L. T. 657. But
the decisions cannot be reconciled on the ground that one is a "succession
tax" and the others are "transfer taxes" since in all the cases the statutory
language defining the tax is practically the same. Cf. 29 DEL. LAwS (1917)
c. 7, § 1; CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918) § 1261. The Massachusetts rule closes
one loophole of escape from taxes left open by the prevailing rule. It
:prevents evasion of taxes by the creation of trusts in anticipation of
increasing inheritance taxes, although it subjects the settler who desires
to create an irrevocable trust to the hazard of heavy increased taxes.
TAXATION-PAYMENTS MADE AFTER EXPIRATION OF LIMITATION PERIOD-
EFFECT ON RECOVERY OF FILING OF CLAIMI IN ASATEIENT.-In 1920 the
plaintiff filed a claim in abatement of taxes for the year 1917. In 1922
the claim was rejected. The taxes were paid under protest in 1924 after
the five-year period of limitations had run. The plaintiff then brought
suit to recover the taxes so paid, under a statute providing for the refund
of taxes paid after the expiration of the limitations period. [19 STAT. 248
(1877), 40 STAT. 1145 (1919), 26 U. S. C. §§ 149, 156 (1926)] While the
action was pending a statute was enacted prohibiting such a recovery
where a claim in abatement had been filed and where as a result collection
had been "stayed." [45 STAT. 875 (1928), 26 U. S. C. § 2611 (1926)
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The lower dourt gave judgment for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that
mere delay in collection is a "stay" within the meaning of the statute.
Judgment reversed. Goodcel -p. Graham, 35 F. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 9th,
1929).
The retroactive feature of the instant statute has been held invalid.
Erie Coal & Coke -v. Heiner, 33 F (2d) 135 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929).
But see Huntley -v. Gile, 32 F. (2d) 85f, 859 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929). "Stay"
has been construed to mean only delay due to legal prohibition against
collection. United States v. Burden, Smith & Co., 33 F. (2d) 229 (C. C. A.
5th, 1929) ; see Pepsin Syrp Co. v. Sclwancr, 35 F. (2d) 197, 199 (S. D.
Ill. 1929). But, as a rule, suits to enjoin the collection of federal taxes
-will not be sustained. Graham v. Dupont, 262 U. S. 238, 43 Sup. Ct 567
(1923) (bar of statute of limitations held not ground for injunction); 4
P omy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: (2d ed. 1919) § 1849; 14 STAT. 475
(1867), 26 U. S. C. § 154 (1926). A few exceptions, however, have been
made. Lipke -. Lederer, 259 U. S. 557, 42 Sup. Ct. 549 (1922) (collection
of tax imposed as a penalty enjoined).; Peerless Woolen Mills r. Rose, 28
F. (2d) 661 (C. C. . 5th, 1928) (collection by distraint enjoined pending
appeal to Board of Tax Appeals); see Dows -v. City of Clhcago, 11 Wall
108, 110 (U. S. 1870). (cases of "special equity"); (1928) 38 YAXE L. J.
122. The report of the Ways and Means Committee of the House of
Representatives, moreover, indicates that Congress intended "stayed" to
mean mere delay. See Huntlej vo. Gile, supra, at 859; KLEIN, FEDERAL
INcoi TAXATIoN (1st ed. 1929) 1599n; cf. Duplex Printing Co. -V. Dcering,
254 U. S. 443, 447, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 179 (1921). As the instant court
suggests, the fact that collection is rarely if ever prohibited by statutory
or injunctive compulsion should lead to the interpretation of "stay" as
meaning mere delay, if the instant statute is to be of any practical utility.
Cf. Oak Worsted Mills v. United States, U. S. Daily, Dec. 18, 1929, at
2794 (U. S. Ct. CL 1929).
TAxA~oN-TnusTs-TA.K ON INTANGIBLE TRUST PnornaRT AT Domnca oF
BENMIARY Wnm TaUSTEE is NON-RISIDENT.-The plaintiff, a Mary-
land corporation, held certain securities in trust for two beneficiaries domi-
ciled in Virginia. The securities -were in the possession of the trustee in
Maryland and had been duly assessed for taxes in that state. The cestuis
had no present right to receive the income from the trust nor the power
to alter the sitas of the securities. The trustee alone -was empowered to
control and reinvest the funds. A tax assessment imposed by Virginia
upon the corpus of the trust estate was sustained by a Virginia court.
Held, on appeal (one justice dissenting), that the judgment be reversed.
Safe Deposit and Trust Co. -s. Virginia, 50 Sup. Ct. 59 (U. S. 1929).
Trust funds are frequently subject to a property tax in several states.
See 2 Coons' TAXAmoN (4th ed. 1924) § 455-469. Thus, if the trustee
has assigned the securities to the use of an agent for business purposes,
they acquire a taxation situs in the state of the agent's domicile. Neo
Orleans -v. Stemple, 175 U. S. 309, 20 Sup. Ct. 110 (1899); see Macay -v.
City of San Francisco, 128 Cal. 678, 686, 61 Pac. 382, 385 (1910). Further-
more, the securities may also be subject to a property tax in the state
of the trustee's residence. Welch v,. Boston, 221 Mass. 155, 109 N. E. 174
(1915); Mackay,' v. City of San Francisco, supra; see Do Ganay v. Ledcrer,
250 U. S. 376, 381, 39 Sup. Ct. 524, 526 (1919). In addition, -when the
secilrities happen to be held by a non-resident trustee some state courts
hold that the state of the cestul's domicile may levy against the cestui
a property tax based upon his interest in the trust City of St. Albans v.
Avery, 95 Vt. 249, 114 AtI. 31 (1921) ; Hunt, v. Perry, 165 Mass. 287, 43
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X. E. 103 (1896).; (1921) 35 HAXv. L. RBv. 94 (the Supreme Court in
the instant case declined to commit itself on this point since this tax was
levied against the trustees). The Constitution does not prohibit "double
taxation." Gf. Crean of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks, 253. U. S. 325, 40 Sup.
Ct. 558 (1920). But had the instant tax not been declared unconstitutional
as an attempt to reach property outside the jurisdiction, it might also
have been declared invalid as imposing a burden disproportionate to the
protection afforded. Cf. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. KentuokV, 199
U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36 (1905) ; Goodsite v. Lane, 139 Fed. 593 (C. C. A.
6th, 1905).
USURY-INJUJNcTIONS--POWER OF STATE TO MAINTAIN ACTION TO ENJOIN
CARMYING ON OF UsuR ous LOAN BusNmSss.-In lending money to laboring
men, the defendants had adopted the practice of obtaining formal assign-
ments of the borrower's wages. By threatening garnishment proceedings
against the employer, they were able to collect interest at rates far in
excess of the maximum set by the usury statute, since to involve an em-
ployer in garnishment proceedings would resulf in the discharge of the
employee. The State of Kansas instituted a proceeding to enjoin and
wind up the defendants' business. The lower court sustained demurrers to
the plaintiff's petitions. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be reversed.
State v. McMahon, 280 Pac. 906 (Kan. 1929).
Under facts similar to those of the instant case formal assignments of
wages have been treated as usurious loans. Wilmarth% v. Hine, 137 App.
Div. 526, 121 N. Y. Supp. 677 (3d Dep't 1910) (borrower not responsible
for failure to pay over wages under an assignment attempting to conceal
a usurious loan).; McWhite v. State, 143 Tenn. 222, 226 S. W. 542 (1921).
But the power td attack a traniaction for usury has generally been con-
sidered to be personal to the borrower and his "privies." Zim=rneran v.
Boyd, 275 Pac. 509 (Cal. 1929) (chattel mortgagor sued by mortgagee's
creditor cannot take advantdge of the usury between creditor and mort-
gagee); cf. Smith v. Becker, 192 Mo. App. 597, 184 S. W. 943 (1916)
(assignee of property pledged to secure a loan can raise the question of
usury). Statutes, however, have sometimes extended this power of attack
to persons not in privity with the contracting parties. RYAN, UsuRY AND
UsuRy LAws (1924) 28-31. Thus in Delaware "anyone who shall sue for
the same" may recover from the usurir a sum equal to the money lent,
one half to go to the person suing, one half to the county in which suib is
brought. DEL. ray. CODE (1915) e. 77, § 2621. Many states have provided
for criminal prosecution of usurers. CAL. CODES AND GEN. LAws (Supp.
1917-1919) act 1675; X. M. ANN. STAT. (1915) § 3528; N. Y. CONS. LAWS
(Cahill, 1923) c. 41, § 2400; R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) a. 228, § 8; S. D.
REV. CODE (1919). § 4382; TENN. ANN. CODE (1918) § 6738; UTAH ComP.
LAWS (1917)- § 3322. And in one jurisdiction where there is no criminal
statute, a direct proceeding by the state against usurious money lenders
has been allowed in the form of an indictment for keeping a "disorderly
house." State v. Dianant, 73 X. J. L. 131, 62 At]. 286 (1905); Stato v.
Martin, 77 N. J. L. 652, 73 Atl. 548 (1909). But of. Commonwealth V.
Mutual Loan and Trust Co., 156 Ky. 299, 160 S. W. 1042 (1913). Appar-
ently no state has before sought to enforce its usury laws by injunction.
In view of the fact that the necessitous borrower is frequently unable to
take advantage of the remedies provided by statute for his protection the
instant decision seems justifiable. But see (1930) 43 HAnV. L. REv. 499.
WiLLs-ADmINiSTRATIoN-Tnm - r•R1o WEIGH INTEREST ON LEGAOY
BEGINS TO RUN.-A will provided that a legacy of $1,000 be paid to each
R ECENT CASE NOTES
of the testator's four daughters and that the estate be divided among them
in equal shares on the death of the mother. The bequest of $1,000 to the
only daughter not of age was payable when she became twenty-one. In
a petition by the executors to settle their accounts, ihed, that, the testator's
intention to provide equally for his four daughters being evident, the
bequest to the infant daughter should bear interest from the date the
legacies to her adult sisters became payable. Matter of Berbling, 134
Misc. 730, 236 N. Y. Supp. 367 (Surf. Ct. 1929).
As a general rule, in the absence of a contrary intention in the will
and of statutory authority, a legacy bears interest from the date it
becomes payable. Matter of Littman's Estate, 132 Misc. 646, 229 N. Y.
Supp. 639 (Surr. Ct. 1928) (legacy payable at marriage or on coming of
age).; Estate of Boyce, 173 Wis. 575, 181 N. W. 735 (1921) (legacy pay-
able out of proceeds of sale of land); 3 WoElrNEE, A.mmCAN LAw OF
An INiSTRAsioN (3d ed. 1923) § 458. Where no time for payment is
clearly indicated by the will, according to the common law rule the legacy
is payable within a year from .the testators death, and interest ordinarily
commences to run at the end of the year. ial of Barrett, 173 Wis. 313,
181 N. W. 220 (1921). This rule has been followed even where the common
law date of payment of the legacy has been changed by statute. Da=*'on
w. Rake, 45 N. J. Eq. 767, 18 AtL 752 (1889). Likewise directions in the
will to pay the legacy "as soon as possible!' or when deem'ed "convenient'
have been held not sufficiently definite to take the case out of this rule.
Warwzi l . ElJ, 59 N. 3. Eq. 44, 44 AtI. 666 (1399); Shepard -V. Bryan,
195 N. C. 822, 143 S. E. 835 (1928). Contra: Christia& v. Catholic Church,
91 NS. J. Eq. 374, 110 AtI. 579 (1920). See 2 PAGE, WILxs (2d ed. 1926)
§ 1395. But, regardless of how the time for payment is determined, to
the general proposition that interest commences at such date, there are
a number of exceptions based on a presumption of a different intent by
the testator. Thus a legacy to a widow in lieu of dower or to a minor
to whom the testator stands in, loco parentis and for whom no other pro-
vision for maintenance is made, carries interest from the death of the
testator. Pollard v. Pollard, 83 Mlass. 490 .(1861); Pearzor's Estate, 251
Pa. 612, 97 At. 71 (1916). But of. Lyon 'v. Industrial School Ass'v, 127
N. Y. 402, 28 N. E. 17 (1891) (no interest allowed where niece of testa-
trix's husband was maintained by him after death of testatrix) ; see Hart
,. William, 77 N. C. 426, 428 (1877) (declaring that any legacy for
maintenance bears interest from the testator's death). A similar rule
applies where the legacy is in satisfaction of a debt. Landis -v. Cumber-
land Th. Co., 92 N. J. Eq. 689, 116 At. 686 (1921). And the same is
true in the case of speciefic legacies which are considered as separated from
the general estate and appropriated upon the testator's death. fatter
of Boyers Estate, 179 N. Y. Supp. 901 (Surr. Ct. 1915). The exception
of the instant case, allowing interest in order to equalize legacies accord-
ing to the supposed intention of the testator, is not without authority.
Dock erys Exrs v. Doc7eyv, 170 Ky. 194, 185 S. W. 849 (1916); cf. Harris
v. Harris's Estate, 82 Vt. 199, 72 Atl. 912 (1909)- Contra: In To Estate of
McAllster, 191 Iowa 906, 183 N. W. 596 (1921). As the rule allowing
interest from the time the legacy is payable is largely one of convenience
the departure in the instant situation seems entirely proper.
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